Moti Yung Biography: Moti Yung is a Distinguished Scientist with Google and an adjunct senior research faculty at Columbia University. He got his PhD from Columbia University in 1988. Previously, he was with IBM Research, Certco, RSA Laboratories, and Snap. Yung is a fellow of the IEEE, the ACM, the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR), and the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science (EATCS). Among his awards is the IEEE-CS Computer Pioneer Award. He is a fellow of the American Academy for Arts and Sciences. Title Anamorphic Cryptography Abstract The notion of Anamorphic Cryptography has been developed to demonstrate that in existing and well established designs of cryptographic schemes, there is a way for users to exchange secret messages, even when an an authority demands to get/ share the private keys of the receiver and dictates messages to the sender. Namely, even under configurations where the use of Cryptography is strongly controlled by some authority (your enterprise, or agnecy, or even some criminal organization, etc.), there is a way to exploit the system for sending messages secure from the authority by the sender and receiver. This has been demonstrated under a few models and various cryptosystems. The basic notion teaches us that limiting crypto and asking to get the key does not prevent the use of cryptosystems to get secret message that are private and not shared with the authority.

Jintai Ding Biography: Jintai Ding is a professor at Tsinghua University and a Charles Phelps Taft Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Cincinnati. He received his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1995. His research was in quantum affine algebras, where he was credited for the invention of the Ding-Iohara-Miki algebra. His current interest is in post-quantum cryptography. He and his colleagues developed Rainbow signature and LWE-based key exchange schemes. Rainbow was a thirdround candidate for the NIST post-quantum standardization process. He and his colleagues completely broke a NIST second round post-quantum signature candidate LUOV and a third round candidate GeMSS (HFEv-), for which they won the best paper honorable mention award for Crypto 2021. He is one of the designers of Kyber KEM scheme which was selected as a key establishment standard by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), to which his patent is currently licensed. Title Post-quantum Cryptography, A New Era Abstract Public key cryptosystems (PKC) are the security foundation of modern communication systems, in particular, the Internet. However, Shor's algorithm shows that the existing PKC like Diffie-Hellmann key exchange, RSA and ECC can be broken by a quantum computer. To prepare for the coming age of quantum computing, we need to build new public key cryptosystems that could resist quantum computer attacks. In this lecture, we will give an introduction to post-quantum cryptography and its recent developments, in particular, the NIST standardization process and its impact. Then we will present a practical and provably secure key exchange protocol based on the learning with errors problems, which is conceptually simple and has strong provable security properties. This new construction was established in 2011-2012. We will explain that all the existing LWE-based key exchanges are variants of this fundamental design.

Steven Duong Biography: Steven (Dung) Duong is a senior lecturer at the School of Computing and Information Technology in the University of Wollongong. He got a PhD in Mathematics from Leiden University in 2013 under the supervision of Hendrik W. Lenstra and Andrea Lucchini. Previously, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Faculty of Mathematics in Bielefeld University and then an assistant professor at the Institute of Mathematics for Industry in Kyushu University. His current research interest focusses on post-quantum cryptography. Title Signatures from Cryptographic Group Actions Abstract Group actions have been recently taken a lot of attention from the research community in designing post-quantum cryptographic protocols from new hardness assumptions. Cryptography from group actions have been found in many directions of post-quantum cryptography such as lattice-based cryptography, isogeny-based cryptography, code-based cryptography, multivariate cryptography, and others. In this talk, I will present some basic notions and cryptographic constructions (e.g. signatures) from group actions in this direction.

Feng Lin Biography: Feng Lin is currently a “Hundred Talents” Young Professor with the School of Cyber Science and Technology, College of Computer Science and Technology in Zhejiang University. He was an Assistant Professor with the University of Colorado Denver, USA, a Research Scientist with the State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo, USA, and an Engineer with Alcatel-Lucent (currently, Nokia). His current research interests include Internet of Things security, smart vehicle security, and AI security. He has published more than 120 research papers in mobile computing and security areas, including Oakland, CCS, Security, NDSS, MobiCom, MobiSys, SenSys, and UbiComp. Dr. Lin was a recipient of the Young Chang Jiang Scholar, ACM SIGSAC China Rising Star Award, Best Paper Awards from ACM MobiSys’20, IEEE Globecom’19, IEEE/ACM CHASE’22, IEEE BHI’17, Best Demo Award from ACM HotMobile’18, and the Best Paper Award Nomination from ACM SenSys’21 and IEEE INFOCOM’21. He serves as an editor for IEEE Network, TPC Chair of ACM Morse’22, and TPC member of MobiCom, SenSys, MobiHoc, IPSN, ICDCS. Title Security on Cross-modality Acoustics: Attack and Defense Abstract Acoustic security is paramount in today's digital era, particularly as device interconnectivity accelerates through the Internet of Things (IoT). By protecting personal and confidential information, it upholds privacy and cultivates trust among users—key components for the continued evolution and uptake of voice-driven technologies. Expanding beyond traditional acoustic monitoring, cross-modality sensing enables the conversion of data across wireless, electromagnetic, and visual signals into auditory information. In this presentation, we will explore cutting-edge research in cross-modality acoustic security, tackling both offensive and defensive strategies. We will delve into the nuances of speech injection attacks, wireless side-channel eavesdropping, and multimodal authentication techniques.